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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL McCONKIE PERRY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
J. ARCHIE McCONKIE and 1/ 
WILLIAM H. McCONKIE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appellants' Brief 
Preliminary Statement 
Case No. 
781' 
This action was brought by Plaintiff, Pearl Mc-
conkie Perry, against the Defendants, her two broth-
ers, to have them adjudged trustees of the lands de-
scribed in her complaint, for the heirs of the estate of 
Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, and to require them 
to account for the income and proceeds derived there-
from. She is the only dissatisfied heir of Virtus Mc-
Conkie, and bases her claim upon the theory that the 
title to the lands in question was in the name of and 
belonged to Virtus F. McConkie at the time of his 
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death, but were not inventoried or included in his 
estate in the probate thereof; and that certain assign-
Iuents transferring and assigning the equity in these 
lands to Virtus McConkie had been altered by re-
Inoval of the name of Virtus F. McConkie, and inser-
tion of the name of J. Archie McConkie. one of the 
defendants. 
Defendants' theory was that J. Archie McConkie 
\Yas the sole owner of the property by virtue of 
patents from the State of Utah; that the father hadn't 
any interest therein; that any interest plaintiff may 
have had under her father's estate, assuming such an 
interest, passed to her mother by virtue of an assign-
ment to the mother and a Decree of Distribution in 
the Estate, which distributed all the particularly de-
scribed property and also all other undescribed and 
unknown property of the estate, to her mother. De-
fendants also raised the question of the Statute of 
Limitations; that this was a collateral attack which 
could not be properly made against the decree, and 
raised the question of whether the plaintiff was not 
suing the wrong parties. 
From a decision of the trial court that defend-
ants hold the property in trust for the heirs of Virtus 
F. McConkie, deceased, and that these heirs are en-
titled to an accounting, the defendants have ap-
pealed. 
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Statement of Facts 
Virtus F. McConkie died February 20, 1920 at 
Maeser, Uintah County, Utah. His widow, Caroline 
E. McConkie \Yas appointed administratrix and pro-
ceeded to administer the estate. She filed the requi-
site inventory and appraisement, but did not include 
in the inventory the property now in dispute, which 
is described frequently in the record as the LaPoint 
property, and will be referred to herein by that desig-
nation. 
All of the heirs met together in the office of Tom 
O'Donnell, an attorney, during the course of the pro-
bate, and at that time the rights of all the children 
(except Marie who was then under age and who 
signed later Tr. 139), assigned all their rights and 
interest in the estate to their mother. (Tr. 8, 139). 
Thereafter, the estate which had a value of approxi-
mately $15,000 was distributed to the mother. (See 
probate file, admitted in evidence Tr. 54). The de-
cree of distribution contained an omnibus clause 
which distributed to Caroline E. McConkie all prop-· 
erty owned by Virtus F. McConkie, whether known 
or unknown. (Ex. Probate File). 
The two sons, Archie and William, continued 
to help the mother operate the property during thE> 
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probate of the estate, and thereafter, and the funds 
derived therefrom were used to defray the family 
expenses. During a part of this ti1ne at least, the fam-
ily group living together consisted of the mother, 
Marie, Leona, the two sons and the plaintiff and her 
four children. (Tr. 117). After the probate of the 
estate it was agreed that Archie and William should 
have the property upon their payment to each of the 
girls the sum of $2,000, and their supporting and 
taking care of the mother's financial needs during 
her lifetime. 
There is considerable evidence that as early as 
1927 Pearl agitated for more money for her share in 
the LaPoint property, and that the boys, upon recom-
mendation of their mother gave each of the girls an 
additional $1,000, and that in fact, Pearl received a 
total of $3500. (Tr. 129, 130, 174). 
Prior to her death Mrs. Caroline E. McConkie 
conveyed the Maeser property to William with the 
exception of the house which she conveyed to Marie 
who took care of her mother's personal needs during 
her declining years. (Tr. 119). 
Prior to their father's death, Archie and William 
and their father worked the ranch properties as part-
ners, and had done so for many years. This included 
the home property at Maeser, and, after its acquisi-
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tion, the property at LaPoint. After their father's 
death Archie and William continued to work to-
gether, although it appears that they kept the La-
Point property separate from the Maeser property~ 
which they operated along \Yith their mother. 
The plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect 
that she at no time prior to 1947 discovered that the 
LaPoint property \vas in her father's name, and that 
she only made this discovery when information frorr1 
an uncle and a third party caused her to investigate. 
CTr. 15, 16, 17) This, despite the fact that she lived 
next door to her parents with her first husband while 
she was married to him, and until she divorced him, 
and then went to live with her mother and brothers 
and sisters upon her divorce shortly after her father's 
death. CTr. 25). 
She testified that at the time of the assignment 
of their rights to their mother in O'Donnell's office~ 
that the only discussion as to the LaPoint property 
was the statement by the mother, affirmed by the 
two boys, to the effect that this property belonged to 
the two boys (Tr. 23), and she knew at the time that 
the boys were living at the LaPoint property CTr. 23). 
For a period of time after her father's death she lived 
at the LaPoint property with her brothers CTr. 24, 
25), after her divorce from her first husband, and 
before she remarried. CTr. 23., 24). 
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She could not remember when she found out 
about the existence of the LaPoint property, and 
didn't know what had been traded for it (Tr. 26, 29, 
34). Her statement was: (Tr. 30) ''\Vell I don't know 
\vhen-I know that the folks had an interest over 
there but I didn't know anything about the deals or 
anything about it, and they swore at the time in Tom 
O'Donnell's office at the time ·we signed that paper 
that 'vas all the interest my dad had." She said that 
she thought it was in her dad's name, but they said 
no it belonged to the boys. (Tr. 38). 
When cross examined with respect to certain 
statement made in a deposition wherein she had an-
swered that she knevv her father had turned in cattle 
and pasture land on the purchase of the LaPoint land, 
she sought to qualify these statements by saying that 
she found these things out in 1949 (Tr. 35, 36). 
J. Percy Goddard testified as an expert that cer-
tain assignments relating to the LaPoint property 
and which appear in the record as exhibits A, Band 
C, had been altered, in that first names therein had 
been removed, and the name J. Archie had been 
substituted therein, leaving the last name McConkie 
as it was originally. (Tr. 55, 56, 57). He also admit-
ted on cross examination that a similar alteration ap-
peared in one assignment in said exhibits prior to the 
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assignment to lVIcConkie~ (Tr. 63)~ so that this prac-
tice \Yas not unique. 
A stipulation was offered by counsel for the de-
fendants that the assignments were changed by J. 
Archie McConkie at the request of his father. Exhibit 
F. is a paragraph from an answer filed in a previous 
suit brought by this same plaintiff, (\vhich case was 
dismissed without prejudice) in which J. Archie Mc-
Conkie alleged that he erased the name of Virtus F. 
McConkie and inserted his own name, at the request 
of his father Virtus F. McConkie and in the presence 
of his father, vVilliam and Caroline E. McConkie. 
The plaintiff failed utterly to prove any of the 
requisite facts under which she would be entitled to 
a recovery. The only testimony she introduced even 
remotely bearing on the change in the assignments 
was her testimony that she and her attorney asked 
Archie and Will if they hadn't erased her dad's name 
on the assignments and put in Arch's and they said 
yes, and Arch said she couldn't do anything about 
it, and Will said they would all stick together (Tr. 10., 
11). 
On the other hand, Marie McConkie Johnson, 
the only living heir of Virtus F. McConkie, aside 
from the litigants, and who had as much to gain as 
did the plaintiff by claiming to have not known 
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about the situation with respect to the LaPoint prop-
erty, testified quite frankly that she did know the 
details of the transaction for the LaPoint property. 
That 80 acres of land in Ashley vVard and some cows 
were traded for it (Tr. 164, 165); that 'Vill and Arch 
and their father worked as partners (Tr. 171) and 
that at the meeting in O'Donnell's office the LaPoin1 
property was discussed as belonging to the boys. 
She also testified to several conversations with 
Pearl subsequent to her father's death, and up to the 
early part of 1946, which indicated that Pearl, dur-
ing all that period of time was aware of the situation 
vvith respect to the LaPoint property, and had been 
trying to get her to join in to get a part of the prop-
erty away from the boys. (Tr. 174, 178, 179). She 
also testified to a conversa~ion in 1928 when Pearl 
told her that she had got the girls an additional 
$1,000 as a share in the LaPoint property (Tr. 174, 
176). She also told of a conversation in July 1946, in 
which Pearl stated she felt she should get more from 
the LaPoint property (Tr. 177) and that she didn't 
think she had got her share from her father's estate. 
Marie also testified that before her father's 
death, she had heard talk at home to the effect that 
the LaPoint property had been fixed to Arch, and 
that the LaPoint property was in Archie's name 
when her father died. (Tr. 168, 184). 
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Verdin Johnson, husband of Marie McConkie 
Johnson corroborated his vv ife as to the 1946 conver-
sation. (Tr. 190, 191). 
\Villiam H. McConkie testified that during his 
father's lifetin1e, he, Archie and their father ran 
their cattle together and the ranches (Tr. 104). That 
the LaPoint property was acquired in April 1918. 
(Tr. 104); that the assignments were changed prior 
to his father's death. (Tr. 135). 
With respect to the meeting in O'Donnell's of-
fice when the heirs assigned their rights to the moth-
. er, he testified that he and his mother had previously 
talked to O'Donnell, and that it was O'Donnell's ad-
vice that they make such a transfer (Tr. 108, 115). 
That they carried this information to the rest of the 
family, and that it was agreed upon and thereupon 
they went to O'Donnell's office and made the assign-
ment. 
He further testified that at the meeting with 
O'Donnell the LaPoint property was discussed pro 
and con and thrashed out (Tr. 110); that it was fully 
discussed before they signed, as belonging to the boys 
(Tr. 110, 111, 116); and that the mother went over 
with them what property belonged to the estate and 
what belonged to the boys (Tr. 116). He also testi-
fied that the agreement to pay the girls $2,000 each 
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arose after the property had been assigned to the 
mother, and came about as a result of the mother 
stating she figured each should have $2,000 out of 
the estate, and if he and Archie would pay each of 
the girls $2,000 and take care of her so long as she 
lived, she would give them her property (Tr. 118, 
119). He also testified that prior to his mother's 
death, she deeded to he and Archie all her property, 
including any interest she had in the LaPoint prop-
erty. (Tr. 119, 120). An objection was sustained to 
this answer, but plaintiff made no motion to strike it. 
C'fr. 120). Defendant' exhibit 3, a quit claim deed 
to the land in LaPoint from the mother to Archie 
vYas offered in evidence but an objection to it was 
erroneously sustained. (Tr. 121) 
William also testified to the payment to Pearl 
of her $2,000 and an additional $1500 beyond this 
CTr. 123, 124 130), which was paid at the mother's 
recommendation (Tr. 129); that this was in January 
of 1927 (Tr. 129, 130). 
J. Archie McConkie testified that they agreed 
to assign all their rights over to their mother prior 
to the time that he and William agreed to pay the 
girls $2,000 (Tr. 244); that after his father's death 
he and Will operated the LaPoint land as partners 
(Tr. 247); that they were the only ones who owned 
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it, and at the tin1e of his father's death they claimed 
it as their n\vn and so stated in O'Donnell's office. 
Appellants have outlined the evidence in con-
siderable detail, because they believe that the trial 
court erred in finding as he did thereon, and that the 
evidence on behalf of the plaintiff is insufficient to 
sustain the court's findings conclusions and judg-
ment, and that to the contrary, the evidence clearly 
supports the defendants' position throughout. 
Statement of Points Relied Upon by the Appellant 
1. There was no evidence introduced to prove 
that Virtus F. McConkie owned the LaPoint property 
at the time of his death, nor any other of the essen-
tial allegations of Plaintiff's complaint. 
2. The evidence is insufficient to support the 
following findings of the Court: 
A. The evidence is insufficient to support the 
part of finding No. 9 wherein the Court found that 
"The said property and assignments referred to in 
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of these findings were owned 
and possessed by the said Virtus F. McConkie at the 
time of his death. 
B. The evidence does not support finding No. 
10 that "Subsequent to the making and delivery of 
said assignments on April 29, 1918, to Virtus F. Mc-
Conkie as set forth in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of these 
findings the defendant J. Archie McConkie falsely 
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and fraudulently, and with the intent to defraud the 
plaintiff and other heirs at law of the estate of Virtus 
F. McConkie, deceased, erased, obliterated and re-
Inoved the name of Virtus F. NicConkie from saiu 
vvritten assignments and inserted in the place thereof 
his ovvn name, J. Archie McConkie; and also at said 
subsequent time erased in the affidavits of citizen-
ship upon said assignments the signature of Virtus F. 
lVIcConkie and inserted his own narne in place there-
of; that the defendant J. Archie McConkie erased, 
obliterated and removed the name of the said Virtus 
F. McConkie from said instruments as hereinabove 
set forth with the knowledge, acquiescense, consent 
and encouragement of the defendant William H. Mc-
Conkie and upon an understanding and agreement 
that the gains to be obtained from aid fraudulent 
scheme in thus removing the name of the said Virtus 
F. McConkie from said instruments would be shared 
by the defendants, J. Archie McConkie and William 
H. McConkie." 
C. , The evidence does not support that part 
of finding No. 11 wherein the court found: "Upon 
the death of the said Virtus F. McConkie, the de-
fendants, J. Archie McConkie and William H. Mc-
Conkie, went into possession of the said real prop-
erty, and the said defendants stated to the plaintiff 
that thev were the owners of said land and that none 
of the same constituted any portion of the said estate 
of Virtus F. McConkie, deceased; that plaintiff and 
other daughters of deceased believed said defendants 
in the statements which they thus made and relied 
thereon, and said statements were falsely and fraud-
ulently made with the intent to deceive the plaintiff 
and the other heirs of the estate of Virtus F. McCon-
kie, deceased; . . . " 
D. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the 
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Court's finding No. 12, ""That plaintiff, at all times 
until on or about the 9th day of April, 1949, believed 
that said property belonged to the said defendants, 
J. ~-\rchie McConkie and VVilliam H. McConkie; that, 
on or about the date last mentioned, plaintiff, for the 
first time, learned that the assignments mentioned 
in paragraph 6, 7 and 8 of these Findings of Fact had 
been forged and altered as hereinabove set forth; 
that upon learning such facts plaintiff immediately 
made demand upon the defendants, and each of 
them, that the estate of Virtus F. McConkie be re-
opened for probate or that said defendants make sat-
isfactory accounting and settlement with plaintiff 
and the other heirs of the said Virtus F. McConkie, 
deceased; that said defendants failed and refused to 
restore said property to the heirs of said estate, or to 
make any accounting whatsoever and on the con-
trary at all times since said demand was made upon 
them the defendants have asserted that said property 
belonged to the defendant J. Archie McConkie in his 
own right." 
E. The evidence is in~uff1cient to support the 
Court's finding No. 13, "That shortly prior to Febru-
ary 14, 1946, the defendant J. Archie McConkie pre-
sented to the State Land Board of the State of Utah~ 
the said forged, altered and mutilated assignments 
and affidavits of citizenship and the State of Utah, 
without detecting that said instruments had been 
forged, altered and mutilated, issued patents to the 
real property hereinabove described to the defendant 
J. Archie McConkie, which said patents are recurded 
in the office of the County Recorder of Uintah Coun-
ty, State of Utah, in Book 33 of Deeds at page 567 and 
569 and that, as a result of said recording, said de-
fendant J. Archie McConkie appears to be the record 
owner of the said real property. 
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F. The evidence is insufficient to support the 
Court's finding No. 15, that "The court finds and de-
cides that plaintiff and the other heirs of Virtus F. 
1\tlcConkie, deceased, are the ovvners of the property 
described in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of these Findings 
... and the court now finds that_ plaintiff and the 
other heirs of the said Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, 
are entitled to such an accounting .... " 
G. The evidence is insufficient to support 
the Court's finding No. 3 of Findings of Fact on De-
fendants' Answer, First Defense, wherein the court 
found that Plaintiff's action was not barred by the 
Statute of Limitations, Sec. 104-2-24 (3), U.C.A. 
1943, and that plaintiff did not learn that the real 
property was owned by Virtus F. McConkie, nor did 
she learn such facts as would put a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence on inquiry until within 
three years from the filing of her compl~int. 
H. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the 
Court's finding No. 1 on Defendants' Second Defense, 
vvherein the court found that J. Archie McConkie 
is not the owner in fee of the property by virtue of 
the patents issued to him by the State of Utah, but 
that the Defendant J. Archie McConkie, holds title 
to said lands in trust for plaintiff and the other heirs 
of Virtus F. McConkie. 
I. The evidence is insufficient to sustain find-
ing No.3 on Defendants' Third Defense, wherein it is 
found: "It is not true that there was an agreement 
between the heirs of Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, 
to the effect that the defendants would take over all 
of the assets of the estate referred to as the LaPoint 
property and pay to the three daughters Pearl Mc-
Conkie Perry~ Marie McConkie and Leona McConkie~ 
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the su1n of $2,000 each and, in addition thereto, pro-
vide and care for the said Caroline E. McConkie for 
the rest of her natural life; in this connection, the 
court finds that the said three daughters last men-
tioned agreed to take the sum of $2,000 each as their 
share of the estate of deceased 'vhich had been listed 
and set forth in the inventory and appraisment there-
in filed; that the gross inventory of said listed estate 
'vhich did not include the land or water stock de-
scribed in plaintiff's complaint was $15,040, and one-
third of the value thereof belonged to Caroline E. 
McConkie, the mother, and the other two-thirds 
thereof, namely approximately $10,000 in value, be-
longed to the five sons and daughters of deceased, 
and that one-fifth of said $10,000 valuation equaled 
$2,000; and, accordingly, and based upon said spe-
cific inventory and listing of the properties of de-
ceased, the plaintiff and her sisters agreed with de-
fendants to accept the sum of $2,000 each in settle-
ment of their distributive portion of said estate; that 
each of said daughters was paid the sum of $2,000; 
it is not true that the plaintiff objected to this amount 
and insisted that she was entitled to a greater sum, 
and it is not true that the plaintiff was paid an addi-
tional $1,000 by way of distribution from said estate; 
and, in this connection, the court finds that the plain-
tiff received an additional $1,000 from the defend-
ants by way of an insurance settlement on plaintiff's 
property, and not otherwise." 
J. The evidence does not sustain finding No. 
4 of Findings of Fact on Defendants' Third Defense 
wherein it found: "The court finds that, when plain-
tiff and her sisters signed the Assignment set forth 
in paragraph 1 above, they signed the same in re-
liance upon the representation made by Caroline 
E. McConkie and the defendants to the effect that 
the real property described in paragraphs 6, 7 and 
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~ of these Findings on plaintiff's complaint did not 
belong to Virtus F. McConkie deceased; that the 
agreement with respect to the payment of $2,000 to 
the daughters of said deceased covered only the prop-
erty of said decedent which had been listed in the 
inventory and appraisement and was not intended 
to affect the property described on plaintiff's com-
plaint; and the court now finds that the plaintiff is 
not estopped by reason of accepting said $2,000 from 
claiming her interest in the real property which was 
omitted from the said inventory and appraisement." 
3. Under plaintiff's own evidence she would 
not be entitled to the award which the court made, 
because J. Archie McConkie and William H. Mc-
Conkie clearly had an interest in the LaPoint prop-
erty during the lifetime of the father. 
4. Plaintiff's right of action, if one ever existed 
is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and by laches. 
5. Plaintiff waived any interest which she may 
have had in the LaPoint property by the assignment 
to her mother, to whom any such interest was dis-
tributed by the Decree of Distribution which may 
not be circumvented by this attack upon it. 
6. Plaintiff's suit is a collateral attack upon 
the Decree of Distribution in the probate of the estate 
of Virtus F. McConkie, which may not be maintained. 
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Argument 
Points I and II 
Plaintiff failed to prove that Virtus F. McConkie owned the 
LaPoint property at the time of his death; and the evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain the findings of the Trial Court. 
These two Points lend themselves to a unified 
treatment, in that they require a review and discus-
sion of the evidence adduced on the trial of the case. 
In order to sustain her position plaintiff must 
prove that Virtus F. McConkie was the owner of an 
equity in the LaPoint property at the time of his 
death; that J. Archie McConkie and William H. Mc-
Conkie fraudulently altered the assignments there-
after, and wrongfully claimed the property as their 
own. 
Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence as to 
ownership of the property by Virtus F. McConkie. 
The most which could possibly be said for her proof 
would be that the assignments to the property, at one 
time stood in the name of Virtus F. McConkie, and 
that his name had been erased therefrom and the 
name of J. Archie McConkie inserted therein. Her 
expert witness in this regard admitted however, that 
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a sirnilar situation had occurred in the assignments 
prior to the assignment to McConkie (Tr. 63). Thus~ 
little if any weight can be afforded such an indecisive 
bit of evidence. 
Yet, from this single shred of evidence as to a 
situation which may have existed with respect to the 
assignments, everything else which the court found 
1nust be inferred. That is, that the substitution of 
names was after the father died, that it was fraudu-
lent and to deceive and defraud she and the other 
heirs. 
She produced no direct evidence of actual own-
ership by Virtus F. McConkie, and in fact conceded 
that she knew that the boys had an interest in the 
property (Tr. 34). There is a single isolated hearsay 
statement allegedly made to her and attributed to an 
uncle to the effect that they hadn't given her all she 
was entitled to (Tr. 15, 16). Nor is there anything 
particularly to show that the uncle had any special 
information . with regards to the situation. Again, 
it is interesting to note that the uncle allegedly did 
not reveal this information to her for twenty six 
years after her father's death, during which time he 
apparently harbored it to himself. No explanation 
for this odd behavior is inserted into the record, and 
bears every evidence of being an afterthought not on 
the part of the uncle, but on the part of the plaintiff. 
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Nnwhere in the record did anyone testify that 
the father O\Yned the property at the time of his 
death, that the change in the assignments were made 
after the father's death, or even that it was reputed 
that the father had some interest in the property. 
The plaintiff contends that the defendants have 
perpetrated a fraud upon her. This she was obliged to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence. Chapman v. 
Troy Laundry Co. 87 Utah 15, 47 P. 2d 1054; Raw-
son v. Hardy, 88 Utah 31, 48 P. 2d 473. 
Furthermore, the fraud must be completely 
proved. Plaintiff must do more than merely estab-
lish a state of facts from which an inference of fraud 
may or may not be reasonably drawn. Wilcox v. 
West, 45 Cal. App. 2d 267, 114 P. 2d 39. Fraud is 
never presumed, but must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence. Goff v. Boma Inv. Co. 116 
Colo. 359, 181 P. 2d 459; Kurz v. Farmers United Co-
op. Pool, 199 Okl. 224, 184 P. 2d 790. 
The most which plaintiff can possibly be said 
to have proved under the most liberal construction 
of her evidence, is a suspicion or inference of fraud. 
Accordingly, she has failed to establish her case by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
Nor does it appear here that the statements 
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1uaue as to ownership were such representations as 
to dissuade the plaintiff from making independent 
investigation in line with her belief that her father 
had an interest in the LaPoint property. Adamson 
v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264. 
Not only did she fail utterly to prove fraud by 
clear and convincing evidence, but she failed to 
establish any of the allegations of her complaint by 
evidence which would be sufficient to meet even the 
burden of preponderance. 
To the contrary, the record clearly establishes 
that the father and two sons worked as partners for 
a great many years (Tr. 104, 105, 171); that the sons 
did not marry until late in life (Tr. 106), and that 
consequently all their efforts and resources were di-
rected into the partnership. That the LaPoint prop-
erty was acquired for the sons, was intended for the 
sons (Tr. 114), and was actually channelled to the 
sons during the lifetime of the father and with the 
full knowledge of all members of the family (Tr. 
135, 168, 170, Ex. F); that some 30 years later, after 
the boys had worked and struggled to pay for the 
property, and to build it into something, and after 
they had paid each of the girls $3,000 and supported 
the entire family a good part of the time, ( 130, 179, 
117) the court without the plaintiff bringing forward 
one shred of evidence to sustain her position, relied 
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upon hearsay and rumor and inference based ap-
parently upon suspicion, to adjudicate the title to 
the property in a manner other than that which the 
record has revealed for many years, and cast doubt 
upon the probate proceedings. 
This record does not sustain the trial court, and 
defendants' motion for nonsuit should have been 
granted. 
FINDING NO. 9 
Finding No. 9 is to the effect that the property 
and assignments to the LaPoint property were owned 
and possessed by Virtus McConkie at the time of his 
death. For the reasons heretofore discussed, this find-
ing is not supported by the evidence. To the contrary, 
the only evidence in the record is to the effect that 
the property had been transferred to J. Archie Mc-
Conkie during the father's lifetime. 
Marie McConkie testified that the title was in 
Archie at the time of her father's death and that 
she had heard conversations in her father's lifetime 
to the effect that the LaPoint property had been 
fixed to Archie (Tr. 168, 184). 
William McConkie testified to like effect, as did 
also Archie (Tr. 135, 247). While William and 
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Archie may be held to closer scrutiny, as should be 
the plaintiff, because of their interest, it is likewise 
abundantly clear that Marie's testimony is entitled 
to great weight since it is all against her interests. 
She stood to gain equally with the plaintiff in an at-
tack upon the Defendants. However, she not only re-
fused to join in such attack because she knew it to 
be unfounded and unwarranted, but also told plain-
tiff she should be ashamed of herself for making 
such an attack which was without merit (Tr. 191). 
A reading of her testimony will show the frank can-
did manner in which she testified even though it was 
against her interests to do so. The evidence in the 
record is such that it does not support Finding No. 9. 
FINDING NO. 10 
Finding No. 10 illustrates very graphically the 
error into which the court fell in this case. This find-
ing is to the effect that Archie with William's aid 
and encouragement fraudulently changed the name 
on the assignments as a part of a fraudulent scheme. 
There is, however, absolutely no evidence to support 
such a finding, and all the evidence is to the con-
trary. Marie's testimony, William's test i m on y, 
Archie's testimony, as well as Exhibit F, which plain-
tiff introduced, being a part of the answer of J. 
Archie McConkie in a previous case, all reveal that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
the changes \Yere 1nade in the lifetime of Virtus F. 
lVIcConkie and \Yith his knowledge and consent, anrl 
in fact that he \Yas the moving party therein. 
FINDING NO. 11 
Finding No. 11 that these defendants stated that 
they \Yere the owners of the land and the plaintiff 
and the other daughters of deceased believed these 
statements and relied thereon, and that the state-
ments were false and fraudulent and made with the 
intent to deceive the plaintiff and the other heirs of 
the estate of Virtus F. McConkie is unique in several 
respects. Plaintiff testified that she knew that the 
boys had an interest in the LaPoint property (Tr. 34) 
thus she could not have been deceived in any event 
except as perhaps to the extent of that interest. 
Marie not only believed the statements of the 
boys as to their ownership, of the property, but testi-
fied that she knew all about the transaction by 
which the property was obtained and knew it was in 
Archie's name and had been fixed to the boys during 
'the life of her father. (Tr. 164, 165, 168, 184) In 
view of the factual basis upon which her belief was 
firmly established;finding No. 11 to the effect that 
she, along with the plaintiff was induced to believe 
some false statements of the boys that they owned 
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the property is little short of amazing. She testified 
to the basis for her knowledge that the property be-
longed to the boys, yet the court says to her in effect: 
"You had no such knowledge. You along with your 
sister Pearl, the plaintiff in this action, were deceived 
by these boys," which is exactly opposite to her 
testimony in this case. If anyone was deceived, it 
clearly was not Marie, who knew from her mother 
and father that the LaPoint property belonged to 
the boys. 
The mother, another heir, surely could not have 
been deceived, since it was she who initially made 
the statement that the property in LaPoint belonged 
to the boys, and this, even according to the plaintiff's 
own testimony. (Tr. 8,22) 
It was the mother who assumed the burden, 
as administratrix, of determining the estate, and its 
contents. It was she who made whatever represen-
tations were made in this regard, and the boys 
merely joint in these statements. Thus, even assum-
ing evidence (which is entirely nonexistent) that 
the boys mislead plaintiff by these statements, still, 
the prime actor in the alleged fraud must necessarily 
have been the mother. Yet, no'Yhere does plaintiff 
accuse her mother of deceiving her by the state-
ments. Thus we have the unique situation of the 
court finding that one of the persons who partici-
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pated in the staternents to the daughter which al-
legedly mislead her, is also found by the court to 
have been mislead, and one of the daughters who tes-
tified that she \vas not mislead by the statements 
because she had independent information that the 
statements were correct, also becoming the defrauded 
parties along with the plaintiff. 
FINDING NO. 12 
Finding No. 12 is to the effect that the plaintiff~ 
until April 9, 1949 believed the property belonged 
to the boys and only after that date made a discovery 
to the contrary and 'that the assignments had been 
fraudulently altered. 
Plaintiff did testify that it was in 1949 that she 
discovered that the assignments were altered, and 
that prior to that, she believed the property to have 
been owned by her brothers. However, this testi-
mony so conflicts with her other testimony and 
the facts as they exist, that it is obvious that this 
finding cannot be sustained. 
Plaintiff says that she knew her folks had an 
interest in the LaPoint property prior to the time 
they met in O'Donnell's office, although she claims 
to have known nothing as to the details, (Tr. 30) and 
that she thought the LaPoint property was in her 
father's name (Tr. 38). 
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She lived next door to her parents during her 
father's lifetime and lived with her mother, sisters 
and brothers after her divorce, as a member of the 
family (Tr. 25). Her sister, living under the same 
circumstances was aware of the transactions and 
knew all that was going on and knew that in the 
father's lifetime he had arranged for the land to go 
to Archie and William (Tr. 164, 165, 168, 184). 
If plaintiff knew as she says she did that her 
folks had an interest in the land and yet that interest 
didn't appear in the properties specifically described 
in the probate, surely this was reason to put her on 
notice that she should make inquiry, and she would 
be bound by what she discovered or should hav~ 
discovered. Of this more will be said under Point IV. 
The point advanced at this time is that the evi-
dence is clear that she knew what the whole situation 
was, that she knew the LaPoint property belonged to 
the boys and could not have been deaf and blind to 
these very apparent facts and that this is the reason 
that she let the matter lie dormant for 30 years. 
Observe, also, that the plaintiff in order to fix a con-
versation which she had with her sister Marie with 
respect to the LaPoint property tied that conversation 
to a registered letter which she had written to 
Archie in February of 1947, (Tr. 206) and which 
involved a claim as to the LaPoint property. She 
also testified that she had a conversation with Wilf 
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lVIcConkie (the uncle) when certain information per-
taining to the property was revealed to her, and that 
this ,,·as in the Spring of 1948 ( Tr. 15, 65) . In seek-
ing to explain certain statements she had made in 
her deposition "·hich indicated that she knew that 
her father had turned in certain land and certain 
cattle on the LaPoint property, she qualified her 
statements by saying that she learned these facts in 
1949. (Tr. 35, 36). Also in evidence is paragraph 
11 of plaintiff's complaint in a previous suit in which 
she alleged: "That the said lands or equities thereon 
of said Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, were never 
included in the probate for the purpose of escaping 
inheritance tax due the State of Utah, and that it had 
been agreed by oral agreement between the heirs 
that the lands would be divided equally between the 
heirs of the decedent, Virtus F. McConkie, as provided 
by law." 
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully sub-
mitted, that Finding No. 12 cannot be supported 
under the evidence. 
FINDING NO. 13 
Finding No. 13 is perhaps not detrimental to 
the defendants except that it repeats the unfounded 
charges of forgery, but has exactly nothing in the 
record to support it. Whether the State of Utah may 
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or Inay not have detected alteration does not appear 
from this record, and certainly it does definitely 
appear that there were other alterations of the assign-
ments than the ones here involved. 
FINDING NO. 15 
Finding No. 15 represents a culmination of the 
other findings hereinabove discussed in that it finds 
that the plaintiff and other heirs are owners of the 
LaPoint property and are entitled to an accounting. 
This finding has equally little support in the 
record. The only evidence in the record is, as has 
been repeated heretofore, that the property was 
fixed to the boys in the father's lifetime at his re-
quest and in his presence; that it had been purchased 
for this purpose, and that all of the interested parties 
were aware of the fact at all times prior to the 
father's death. 
The finding is also subject to the defect that it 
appears to be a collateral attempt at adjudication of 
a title to property which passed under the Decree of 
Distribution as will more fully appear under point 
VI herein. 
The trial of the case was commenced November 
13, 1950. On November 15, 1950 the court took un-
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der advisement the defendants' motion for nonsuit. 
On January +, 1951 the Court concluded that there 
was sufficient to make out a prima facie case. Trial 
was resumed June 4, 1951, and the court rendered a 
Memorandum Decision July 20, 1951 and the find-
ings were filed in December of 1951. Thus, a con-
siderable time intervened in the trial of the case. 
Sufficient time, in fact, that the evidence or lack 
thereof may have become confused by the court with 
the allegations of the complaint which is much more 
comprehensive than was the proof which the plain-
tiff offered. 
Whatever the reason for the erroneous findings,. 
however, the defendants earnestly submit that the 
evidence fails to sustain the findings of the trial court, 
and that for this reason the case should be reversed. 
* * * * * 
Findings on Defendants' First, Second 
and Third Defenses 
FINDING NO. 3, DEFENDANTS' FIRST DEFENSE 
In this finding the court finds that plaintiff was 
not barred by the Statute of Limitations. The 
evidence on this matter is treated separately at Point 
IV. 
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FINDING NO. 1, DEfENDANTS' SECOND DEFENSE 
This is a finding against ownership by J. Archie 
McConkie, and the evidence supporting this owner-
ship is fully developed in the discussed under Find-
ings No. 9, 10, 11, 12, and 15. 
FINDING NO. 3, DEFENDANTS' THIRD DEFENSE 
This findings is to the effect that the sisters 
agreed to accept $2,000 each in settlement of their 
distribution share of the father's estate as it was listed 
and specifically described in the probate proceedings. 
The court apparently proceeds in this finding upon 
the theory that the estate was distributed to the 
mother and the assignments of the childrens' inter-
ests to the mother pursuant to the agreement that the 
boys were to take over the property. Such a theory 
cannot be sustained under the evidence. 
The only evidence with respect to the agree-
ment on the part of the boys to take over the property 
and pay the girls $2,000 each is to the effect that 
quite some time after the estate had been closed and 
the property distributed, to the mother, she made the 
proposition to the boys that if they would pay the 
girls $2,000 each and would take care of her in her 
lifetime, then she would convey her estate to them. 
Even the plaintiff with all her claims, did not offer 
any testimony which would in any way indicate that 
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these parties had n1ade an agree1nent before thf 
assignment to their n1other, that the boys were to 
take over the property. Her testimony was that the 
mother had agreed to take the property and divide it, 
and that she asked her mother for the money and 
'vas informed that the boys would have to pay her. 
(Tr. 44). It is obvious, therefore that there was no 
agreement amongst the family members prior to the 
decree of distribution in probate, that the boys would 
take over the property and pay the girls therefore, yet 
this finding along with the others seems to tie the 
agreement to the specific property and specific tran-
saction. 
FINDING NO. 4, DEFENDANTS' THIRD DEFENSE 
This finding is to the effect that plaintiff and her 
sisters relied upon the representations that defend-
ants' owned the LaPoint property and signed the re-
lease in reliance thereon and also that the $2,000 paid 
to each of the girls was only as to the property listed 
specifically in the inventory and appraisement, or in 
other words, the Maeser property. 
As pointed out in the discussion under Finding 
No. 9 and 11, Marie testified that she did not rely 
upon such representations, because she had in-
dependent knowledge that the facts were as stated at 
that time. Thus, this finding is not sustainable in 
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this respect, and as pointed out a hove with reference 
to Finding No. 3, Defendants' Third Defense, the 
$2,000 had nothing to do with the assignments to the 
mother, but was an independent transaction which 
arose after the termination of the probate. 
It is respectfull ysubmitted that the Findings on 
Defendants' First, Second and Third Defense are not 
sustained by the evidence. 
Point Ill 
Under Plaintiff's own evidence she would not be entitled to 
the award which the court made, because J. Archie McConkie and 
William H. McConkie clearly had an interest in the LaPoint prop-
erty during the lifetime of the father. 
Plaintiff admitted knowledge that Archie and 
William had an interest in the LaPoint property 
(Tr. 34). Having admitted knowledge of such an 
interest, the question then is what was the extent 
of that interest. In this we look to the evidence 
which establishes that for many years prior to the 
father's death, he and his two sons, Archie and 
William had been partners in the ranching and cattle 
raising business. ( Tr. 104, 105, 171 ) . This evidence 
stands completely uncontradicted, and undisputed 
and the Court was not at liberty to disregard it~ 
Parker v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 68 Utah 472, 251 
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P. 11; Harness v. Ind. Con1m., 81 Utah 276, 17 P. 
2d ']. 7 7; Hynes v. vVhite +7 Cal. app. 5+9, 190 P. 838; 
20 ~-\m. Jur. 1030 Evidence Section 1180. Therefore~ 
in any event, they had at least partnership interests 
in the property, and the court erred in failing to 
determine the extent of the partnership interest, or 
in excluding the partnership interest from the duty 
to account, and erred in finding contrary to plain-
tiff's o\'vn evidence, that the boys had no interest in 
the property except as heirs. 
* * * * * 
Defendants feel that the evidence fails to sustain 
plaintiff in making out a prima facie case of fraudu-
lent misrepresentations to her and the other heirs, 
and that accordingly the court erred in not granting 
defendants' motion for nonsuit; that the court erred 
in its findings in the respects heretofore noted, in 
that the evidence does not sustain such findings. 
However, it appears to defendants that even assuin-
ing that the court was correct in determining that 
the father owned or had an interest or equity in the 
LaPoint property at the time of his death, that still 
the plaintiff is not and was not entitled to prevail in 
this action. Accordingly, the following points and 
arguments assume (for the purpose of argumen1 
only) the father's interest in the property. 
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Point IV 
Plaintiff's right of action, if one ever existed is barred by the 
Statute of Limitations. 
Section 104-2-22 ( 1) U .C.A. 1943 establishes the 
limitation for an action for the mesne profits of real 
property to be six years. Section 104-2-24 (3) U.C.A. 
1943 fixes the period of limitations for relief from 
fraud or 1nistake to be three years from the time of 
the discovery of the fraud. 
The plaintiff very carefully attempted to keep 
her action from being barred by this latter section, 
by testimony that she learned nothing of her right 
of action until just prior to the commencement of her 
action. However, the principle is well established 
that whatever is notice to excite attention, and put 
a party on his guard and call for inquiry, is notice 
of everything to which such inquiry would have 
lead. The Statute of Limitations begins to run from 
the discovery of the fraud or discovery of such facts 
as would put a person of ordinary intelligence on 
notice. Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426; 
Larson v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 23 Utah 457, 
65 P. 208; Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork v. Span-
ish -Fork South Irrigation Co., 107 Utah 279, 153 
P. 2d 547. 
The plaintiff's testimony in this case shows that 
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she was concerned about the property, and asked 
about it having a question in her mind concerning 
it at the tin1e of the 1neeting in O'Donnell's office. 
(Tr. 30). She knew of the existence of the property, 
(Tr. 30) she kne'\lv her folks had an interest in it, 
(Tr. 30), and she thought it was in her father's 
name (Tr. 38). She lived with the defendants and 
her mother and sisters for a considerable period of 
time froin 1920 to 1924 (Tr. 25), and could scarcely 
have been unaware of the conversations and discus-
sions which took place concerning the property. 
vVhatever investigation she made in 1949, which 
revealed, according to her theory (although not ac-
cording to the evidence), that her father owned the 
property, \Yould have been as easily discoverable at 
that time. 
It does not appear that she troubled herself to 
1nake any further inquiry of the mother and the 
brothers at the time of the meeting in O'Donnell's 
office, although the perfectly natural thing to do 
under such circumstances would have been to voice 
her inquiry as to how come the LaPoint property 
belonged to the boys when she thought her father 
had an interest in it, and thought it was in his name. 
The ideal time to have cleared up these questions 
would have been prior to signing the assignment, 
and at a time when any search she might have made 
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would have been rewarded by immediate answers. 
Plaintiff also testified that she knew her father 
turned some cattle and made some payments on the 
property in question by turning in land on it CTr. 35). 
True, she qualified this statement from her deposi-· 
tion, by explanation that she learned these facts at 
a later date. However, inquiry at the time the ques-
tion arose in her mind, would have revealed these 
facts to her in 1920 if they were true. Her statement 
from her pleadings in the previous action (Tr. 215), 
which we have heretofore quoted under point II, 
indicates a purpose for not including the land in the 
estate which is inconsistent with lack of knowledge 
of the interest which her father had in it. 
It is submitted that the foregoing evidence es-
tablishes that the plaintiff Pither knew, or in the ex· 
ercise of her faculties as a person of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence, she was put on notice by the 
probate proceedings and should have made inquiry 
and could have discovered the full facts as she alleges 
them to be, assuming the existence of such facts 
and that therefor~, she is barred by the Statute of 
Limitations, many times over, 
It is further submitted, that the evidence of 
Marie McConkie Johnson and Verdin Johnson, two 
witnesses whose interests were counter to their testi-
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n1ony, standing as it does, is conclusive that Pearl 
McConkie Perry had full knowledge of the existence 
of the LaPoint property and the situation surround-
ing it at least as far back as 1927 and 1946, and 
further substantiate the fact that Plaintiff is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations and by Laches front 
asserting any rights which might exist. 
Point V 
Plaintiff waived any interest which she may have had in the 
LaPoint property by the assignment to her mother, to whom any 
such interest was distributed by the Decree of Distribution which 
may not be circumvented by this attack upon it. 
If the father had an interest in the LaPoint pro-
perty, then it was disposed of in the probate of that 
Estate by the Decree of Distribution, and passed to 
the mother Caroline E. McConkie, and this regard-
less of whether or not a fraud was perpetrated upon 
the plaintiff whereby such a thing was made pos-
sible. This is illustrated as follows: 
The children assigned all of their interest in the 
Estate to their mother. If the LaPoint property was 
a part of the father's estate, then it was assigned. 
The "omnibus" clause in the Decree of Distribution 
then passed title to this property to Caroline E. Mc-
Conkie, and there can be no question but that this 
is the exact effect of the Decree of Distribution. 
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The rule is stated in 4 Bancroft, Probate Prac-
tise, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1144, to be that: 
" It is customary to conclude the decree 
with an "omnibus" clause to guard against 
omissions and failures in specific description. 
Under such a clause the whole of the residue~ 
whether described or undescribed, known or 
unknown, may be distributed. . . . " 
In Smith v. Biscailuz, 83 Cal. 344, 21 P. 15, cer-
tain real property was not mentioned in the probate 
of the estate other than the fact that the decree of 
distribution contained an "omnibus" clause. It was 
held that the decree passed title to the property not 
mentioned which belonged to the decedent. 
Similarly, in the case In re Bouche's Estate 24 
Cal. App. 2d 86, 74 P. 2d 563, where property 
was involved which had not been included specifi-
cally in the probate decree, but the decree contained 
an omnibus clause. The trial court in that case upon 
petition allowed the estate to be re-opened to ad-
minister newly discovered assets. On appeal the 
court held, however, that there was no need to re-
open to administer such assets, because they passed 
under the original decree, and reversed the trial 
court. Said the court: 
"In the case at bar the decree of distri-
bution adequately provided as hereinbefore 
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noted, for the distribution of "any other pro-
perty belonging to said estate, whether de-
scribed herein or not, as "Tell as for the distri-
bution of the rest, residue, and remainder of 
said estate." This provision vested in the 
trustees \Yhatever estate the contract in ques-
tion created. (citing Humphry v. Protestant, 
etc., Church 154 Cal. 170, 97 P. 187; Victoria 
Hosp. Ass'n v. All Persons, 169 Cal. 455, 147 
P. 124) ... " 
In Humphry v. Protestant etc., Church, 154 Cal. 
170, 97 P. 187; and Victoria Hosp. Ass'n v. All Per-
sons etc., 169 Cal. 455, 147 P. 124, the same rule is 
followed. 
Utah has recognized this rule in the recent case 
of Jones v. Cook, (Utah) 223 P. 2d 423: wherein the 
effect of such an omnibus clause was stated to be: 
"The phrase 'any and all other property 
not now known or discovered which may be-
long to said estate or in which said estate may 
have an interest,' covers any property not spe-
cifically described which was owned by dece-
dent and not disposed of in the regular course 
of probate." 
Thus, if plaintiff is correct in her assertion that 
the LaPoint property should have been included in 
the estate, and if she proves that it was a part of the 
estate, she also proves that it passed to the mother 
under the Decree of Distribution. 
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It follows therefore, that she must make a direct 
attack upon that decree rather than a collateral 
attack, and that she must vacate the decree of distri-
bution on the ground of fraud, and that otherwise the 
decree distributing the property to the mother, is 
presumptively valid. 
Nowhere does the plaintiff charge her mother 
with having fraudulently failed to include the La-
Point property in the estate whereby she was induced 
to sign the assignment which had the effect of allow-
ing the property to be conveyed in probate to the 
mother. Yet, necessarily, this must be charged and 
proved under any theory upon which the plaintiff 
might elect to proceed. Mrs. Caroline E. McConkie 
by all the testimony, including that of the plaintiff 
told all parties concerned at the time the assignment 
was made to her that the boys owned the LaPoint 
property. This being so, plaintiff must charge and 
prove that the mother defrauded her of her rights, 
if, as she insists, the father had some interest in the 
LaPoint property at the time of his death. 
However, at no point does she make such an 
accusation against her mother to whom the property 
passed if it was a part of the estate. Her complaint 
is that the boys got the property which is a part of 
the estate. If it was a part of the estate, then the 
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boys acquired it from the mother by her deed to 
them, and again the plaintiff must charge that the 
mother obtained the property from her by fraud. 
In this she would be in the unique position of being 
the only heir who would claim her mother perpe-
trated a fraud, \Vith her sister who would have 
equally as much to gain by such an accusation main-
taining stoutly that there was absolutely no fraud 
involved. 
Point VI 
Plaintiff's suit is a collateral attack upon the Decree of Dis-
tribution in the Probate of the Estate of Virtus F. McConkie, which 
may not be maintained against these defendants. 
1 Bancroft Probate Practice, 2nd Ed. Sec. 81, 
282, 130 P. 217, wherein it was stated: 
"The general rule is now well established 
that a judgment, order, or decree of a probate 
court ... is equally as immune from collateral 
attack as is the judgment of any other court 
whatsoever., acting within the scope of its 
state the rule to be: 
That a decree may not be attack collaterally is 
established in Utah by the case In re Evans, 42 Utah 
jurisdiction. . . " 
"The law is well settled that a decree of 
distribution in probate proceedings, after due 
and legal notice, by a court having jurisdiction 
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of the subject matter is conclusive as to the 
fund, items, and matters covered by and pro-
perly included within the decree until set 
aside or modified by the court entering the 
decree in the manner prescribed by law~ or 
until reversed on appeal." 
That the attack in this case is collateral is clearly 
established by Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 P. 
3d 1 S 7. In that case, this court held that a "direct 
attack" was an attempt to correct or avoid the judg-
nlent in some manner provided by law. That it is 
an attack by appropriate proceedings between the 
parties thereto, seeking to have the judgment an-
nulled, reversed, vacated, or declared void. Con-
versely, when the direct purpose and aim of the pro-
ceeding is to attain relief other than setting aside or 
modifying the judgment and the attack upon the 
judgment is merely incidental, then the attack is 
collateral. 
Tested by these standards, it is obvious that the 
attack in this case is collateral. The avowed purpose 
of the suit was to require the defendants to hold the 
property in trust for the heirs of Virtus F. McConkie, 
and for an accounting. 
It is obvious that the paramount purpose here 
was not to vacate the decree for cause, since the plain-
tiff did not, in her pleadings at any point charge the 
administratrix with having defrauded her. Yet, this 
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would have been ~bsolutely essential to a suit to va-
cate the decree, since the misrepresentation was one 
made by the administratrix, the Decree of Distribu-
tion passed the property to the Administratrix, and 
anything \vhich she may have elected to do with the 
property thereafter was something which she should 
be held accountable for. 
Thus, if plaintiff's proof is correct, then her 
mode of procedure is wrong, and she is proceeding 
against the wrong parties. 
So long as the decree in probate stands, it is the 
rights of the parties, which means that the plaintiff 
has no interest in any of her father's estate, she 
having assigned her interests, and the Decree of Dis-
tribution having distributed that estate to her mother. 
She has not vacated the decree, and is bound by it. 
This property, if it was a part of the father's 
estate, passed to the mother under the probate. She, 
and she alone was answerable to the plaintiff for any 
misrepresentation, because it was she who received 
the property by virtue of the claimed misrepresenta-
tion. It is respectfully submitted, that the trial court 
had no authority whatsoever, under the circum-
stances to find against the defendants and require 
them to account, and that the decree in probate stand-
ing as it does, precludes such a proceeding as here 
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bro~ght and adjudicated . by the trial court. The 
adjudication in this case constitutes an impeachment 
of, and contradiction of the decree of Distribution yet 
that decree stands unvacated. 
* * * * * 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants respectfully submit that the 
trial court committed the following fundamental 
errors in the trial and disposition of this case. 
1. The trial should have granted defendants' 
motion for dismissal or nonsuit because plaintiff fail-
ed to establish a prima facia case. 
2. The great proponderance of the evidence in-
dicates that the property here involved did not be-
long to the deceased, and that it did belong to J. 
Archie McConkie, and that there was and is no fraud 
involved, and that plaintiff failed to establish her 
case. 
3. That even assuming an interest in the estate, 
and assuming her right to reach it in these proceed-
ings, the court erred in ruling that the entire LaPoint 
property was included in the estate, under the evi-
dence that the father, and the two sons were co-part-
ners. 
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4. That plaintiff is barred by the Statute of 
Limitations and by laches from asserting her claimed 
rights. 
5. That plaintiff's rights if any she had passed 
by virtue of the assignment to her mother and the 
Decree of Distribution. 
6. That plaintiff without directly attacking the 
decree and establishing that she was defrauded by 
her mother into assigning her property rights to her 
mother, thus enabling the mother to get a distribu-
tion of the property of the estate to her, may not 
proceed against these defendants in derrogation of 
the Decree of Distribution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLTON AND HAMMOND 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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